Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that in large symmetric auctions with conditionally i.i.d. common values and CARA preferences, the second-price auction raises more revenue than the rst-price auction. We also show by an example that the ranking does not extend to general symmetric risk-averse preferences.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 91 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015