Equilibrium selection in bargaining models
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games. 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C78
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003