Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket

A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefs about our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies. A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I will argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness. But I suggest that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies. Others have worried that the logical possibility of zombies implies that you or I might be one (e.g., Dennett, 1991, see also Bayne 2001). The case of the phenomenal pickpocket shows us why we must take this worry seriously. 1. There are several different senses of the word ‘‘consciousness’’. I am concerned with the phenomenal sense. I am conscious in this way in that there is something that it is like to be me. Accordingly, a mental state is conscious in this way when there is something it is like to be in that mental state, when it has a particular qualitative feel or aspect. If we assume for the sake of argument that I am conscious in this sense when I have some qualitatively conscious mental states, then Synthese (2006) 149: 37–58 Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-6241-3 (1) I am certain that I have qualitatively conscious mental states or experiences. In saying that I am certain that I have at least some qualitatively conscious mental states, I mean that I am able to justifiably rule out all possibilities that I do not have conscious mental states. Alternatively, we might say that I know that I have such states in the strongest sense of ‘‘know’’, or that I am conclusively justified in believing that I have such states. Certainty is a much stronger epistemic category than knowledge in the usual sense of ‘‘knowledge’’ – the sense in which we say that we know that we have enoughmoney to pay the bill, or that we know where our car is parked. Obviously, the same can be said for the relationship between certainty and mere justification; I have many justified beliefs that are not certain. So we should modify (1) a little to account for some small misgivings. For one thing, no one is certain that they will be conscious in the future. You might even doubt that you were conscious yesterday (perhaps your memory has been altered). Further, you probably aren’t certain that every state of your mind is conscious. So I’ll stipulate that (1) is equivalent to (1a) I am certain that I have some qualitatively conscious mental states now. Few things in life are certain. But for most people, (1) will be among them, and requires no argument. But if arguments are needed, here are three. First, try to seriously consider the thought that (C-): I am having no qualitatively conscious thoughts right now. I would be surprised if you can do so. To consider (C-) requires a conscious thought with a distinctive qualitative feel (some of my students describe it as ‘making their head hurt’). Thus it is impossible to consciously entertain that (C-) is true. To even consciously consider the thought that I am not conscious I must have at least one conscious thought. Therefore, it seems as if I can rule out the possibility that I am not conscious now simply by consciously wondering whether it is true. And that strongly suggests that (1) is true. Not everyone may be convinced by this argument. Some, for example, may not find (C-) to have a qualitative feel; if so, then perhaps I might unconsciously consider whether (C-) is true. Therefore, here is another, and perhaps more intuitive route to the same conclusion. One reason to think that a proposition is certain is that you can’t imagine that it is false. I can’t imagine that I am having no conscious, phenomenal experience now. This is not only because imagining is a form of conscious thought, it is because imagining myself without any M.P. LYNCH 38