A 286 F2/Cell Distributed Bulk-Current Sensor and Secure Flush Code Eraser Against Laser Fault Injection Attack on Cryptographic Processor
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0018-9200,1558-173X
DOI: 10.1109/jssc.2018.2869142