A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Complexity and Algorithm for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular and Subadditive Bidders
In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with k(> 1)duplicates of each item, where k is a fixed constant (i.e. k is not the part of the input) and bidders are submodular or subadditive. We exhibit some upper and lower approximation bounds for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions. First, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate the maximum welfare for k...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2374-3468,2159-5399
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011949