A Centrality-Based Security Game for Multihop Networks

A Centrality-Based Security Game for Multi-Hop Networks

We formulate a network security problem as a zero-sum game between an attacker who tries to disrupt a network by disabling one or more nodes, and the nodes of the network who must allocate limited resources in defense of the network. The utility of the zero-sum game can be one of several network performance metrics that correspond to node centrality measures. We first present a fast centralized...

Security for Multihop Wireless Networks

Interdependent Security Game Design over Constrained Linear Influence Networks

In today's highly interconnected networks, security of the entities are often interdependent. This means security decisions of the agents are not only influenced by their own costs and constraints, but also are affected by their neighbors’ decisions. Game theory provides a rich set of tools to analyze such influence networks. In the game model, players try to maximize their utilities through se...

A Relaying Incentive Scheme for Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalition Game with Externalities

Cooperative multihop communication can greatly increase network throughput, yet packet forwarding for other nodes involves opportunity and energy cost for relays. Thus one of the pre-requisite problems in the successful implementation of multihop transmission is how to foster cooperation among selfish nodes. Existing researches mainly adopt monetary stimulating. In this manuscript, we propose i...

Centrality in directed social networks. A game theoretic approach

In this paper we define a family of centrality measures for directed social networks from a game theoret71 eywords: ocial networks ame theory ical point of view. We follow the line started in our previous paper (Gómez et al., 2003) and, besides the definition, we obtain a characterization of the measures and an additive decomposition in three summands that can be interpreted in terms of emissio...