A Comprehensive Characterization of Threats Targeting Low-Latency Services: The Case of L4S

New services with low-latency (LL) requirements are one of the major challenges for envisioned Internet. Many optimizations targeting latency reduction have been proposed, and among them, jointly re-architecting congestion control active queue management (AQM) has particularly considered. In this effort, Low Latency, Loss Scalable Throughput (L4S) proposal aims at allowing both Classic LL traffic to cohabit within a single node architecture. Although architecture sounds promising improvement, it can be exploited by an attacker perform malicious actions whose purposes defeat its feature consequently make their supported applications unusable. paper, we exploit different vulnerabilities L4S which root possible attacks show that application-layer protocols such as QUIC easily hacked in order over-sensitivity those new network variations. By implementing undesirable flows real testbed characterizing how they impact proper delivery flows, demonstrate reality give insights research directions on detection.