A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.001