A dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing

A dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing

We propose a dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing. By taking into account the change in the stock of workers’ knowledge, firms set efficiency wages such that the effort–wage elasticity is not in general equal to one.  2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

Hidden Effort, Learning by Doing, and Wage Dynamics

M any occupations are subject to learning by doing: Effort at the workplace early in the career of a worker results in higher productivity later on.1 In such occupations, if effort at work is unobservable, a moral hazard problem arises as well. The combination of these two characteristics of effort implies that employers need to provide incentives for the employee to work hard, possibly in the ...

A Cognitive Model of Learning by Doing

In this paper an approach to learning cognitive skills from problem solving experience is presented – addressing some phenomena well known from human learning but seldom covered together in machine learning. The core of our approach is the acquisition of recursive program schemes (RPSs) by generalization-to-n over plans, using an inductive program synthesis technique. RPSs represent domain spec...

Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing

Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation strengthens the power of incentives and allows the principal to provid...

Test Of Efficiency- Wage Model For Iran's Economy