A Dynamic Market Clearing Price Mechanism with Multiple Demands
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Dynamic Market Clearing Price Mechanism with Multiple Demands*
We propose a dynamic selling procedure for the generalization of the buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) to the case where buyers can purchase more than one indivisible object, up to their quota, and have separable and additive utilities. This mechanism generalizes the auction studied by Demange et al. (1986), which in its turn is a generalization of the English auction to the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Brazilian Review of Econometrics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1980-2447
DOI: 10.12660/bre.v25n22005.2506