A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are represented by the epsilon-contamination model. We show that a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with optimal auctions under IPV without ambiguity as well as wi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.02.003