A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model of Human-Mediated Aquatic Species Invasions

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Agricultural and Resource Economics Review

سال: 2006

ISSN: 1068-2805,2372-2614

DOI: 10.1017/s106828050001011x