A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have developed a framework for compositional analysis of a large class of security protocols. The framework is intended to facilitate automatic as well as manual verific...
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ing nonces by constants, an unbounded execution of the NeedhamSchroeder protocol can be represented by the following set CNS of clauses: ⇒ I(enca(〈na, a〉, pub(i))) I(enca(〈x, a〉, pub(b))) ⇒ I(enca(〈x, nb〉, pub(a))) I(enca(〈na, y〉, pub(a))) ⇒ I(enca(y, pub(i))) For simplicity, we have only described the clauses corresponding to the case where A starts sessions with a corrupted agent I and B is w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information and Computation
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0890-5401
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2007.07.002