A Hardware Design Language for Timing-Sensitive Information-Flow Security
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Hardware Design Language for Efficient Control of Timing Channels
Information security can be compromised by leakage via low-level hardware features. One recently promi-nent example is cache probing attacks, which rely on timing channels created by caches. We introduce a hardwaredesign language, SecVerilog, which makes it possible to statically analyze information flow at the hardware level.With SecVerilog, systems can be built with verifiable con...
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Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker’s observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventio...
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Common protection mechanisms fail to provide end-to-end security; programs with legitimate access to secret information are not prevented from leaking this to the world. Information-flow aware analyses track the flow of information through the program to prevent such leakages, but often ignore information flows through covert channels even though they pose a serious threat. A typical covert cha...
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Cryptographic cores are known to leak information about their private key due to runtime variations, and there are many well-known attacks that can exploit this timing channel. In this work, we study how information theoretic measures can quantify the amount of key leakage that can be exacted from runtime measurements. We develop and analyze twenty two RSA hardware designs – each with unique pe...
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Timing side channels are a serious threat to the security of cryptographic algorithms. This paper presents a novel method for the timing-sensitive analysis of information flow in synchronous hardware circuits. The method is based on a parameterized notion of confidentiality for finite transition systems that allows one to model information leakage in a fine-grained way. We present an efficient ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0163-5964
DOI: 10.1145/2786763.2694372