A Higher-Order Approach to Diachronic Continence

We often form intentions to resist anticipated future temptations. But when confronted with the temptations our resolutions were designed withstand, we tend revise previous evaluative judgments and conclude that should now succumb—only then revert initial evaluations, once temptation has subsided. Some made under sway of are mistaken. not all them are. When belief one succumb is a proper response relevant considerations have newly emerged, can acting in line one’s intention nonetheless be practically rational? To answer this question, I draw on recent debates nature higher-order evidence what rationally responding such involves. propose agents facing “deliberative unreliability”, which they ought heed even it “misleading” (that is, their fact responses available). Because deliberative unreliability “dispossess” normative reasons for actions would otherwise have, being continent despite judging more rational than giving in.