A Logic for Reasoning About Knowledge of Unawareness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Logic for Reasoning About Knowledge of Unawareness
In the most popular logics combining knowledge and awareness, it is not possible to express statements about knowledge of unawareness such as “Ann knows that Bill is aware of something Ann is not aware of” – without using a stronger statement such as “Ann knows that Bill is aware of p and Ann is not aware of p”, for some particular p. In Halpern and Rêgo (2006, 2009b) (revisited in Halpern and ...
متن کاملReasoning about Knowledge of Unawareness
Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic for many applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which he is unaware without there being an explicit fact that the agent knows he is unaware of. We propose a logic for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness, b...
متن کاملInductive Reasoning about Unawareness Inductive Reasoning about Unawareness
We develop a model of games with awareness that allows for di erential levels of awareness. We show that, for the standard modal logical interpretations of belief and awareness, a player cannot believe there exist propositions of which he is unaware. Nevertheless, we argue that a boundedly rational individual may regard the possibility that there exist propositions of which she is unaware as be...
متن کاملInductive reasoning about unawareness
We develop a model of games with awareness that allows for differential levels of awareness. We show that, for the standard modal-logical interpretations of belief and awareness, a player cannot believe there exist propositions of which he is unaware. Nevertheless, we argue that a boundedly rational individual may regard the possibility that there exist propositions of which she is unaware as b...
متن کاملTITLE : Inductive Reasoning About Unawareness
We develop a model of games with awareness that allows for differential levels of awareness. We show that, for the standard modal logical interpretations of belief and awareness, a player cannot believe there exist propositions of which he is unaware. Nevertheless, we argue that a boundedly rational individual may regard the possibility that there exist propositions of which she is unaware as b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Logic, Language and Information
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0925-8531,1572-9583
DOI: 10.1007/s10849-014-9201-4