A necessary and sufficient condition for M-matrices and its relation to block LU factorization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
LU -factorization of Block Toeplitz Matrices
We give a review of the theory of factorization of block Toeplitz matrices of the type T = (Ti−j)i,j∈Zd , where Ti−j are complex k × k matrices, in the form T = LDU, with L and L−1 lower block triangular, U and U−1 upper block triangular Toeplitz matrices, and D a diagonal matrix function. In particular, it is discussed how decay properties of Ti a ect decay properties of L, L−1, U , and U−1. W...
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It is well known that any nonsingular M–matrix admits an LU factorization into M–matrices (with L and U lower and upper triangular respectively) and any singular M–matrix is permutation similar to an M–matrix which admits an LU factorization into M–matrices. Varga and Cai establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a singular M–matrix (without permutation) to allow an LU factorization wit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Linear Algebra and its Applications
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0024-3795
DOI: 10.1016/0024-3795(94)00164-2