A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Note on , , Renegotiation in Repeated Games ” [ Games Econ . Behav .
In Farrell and Maskin (1989), the authors present sufficient conditions for weakly renegotiation-proof payoffs in their Theorem 1 (p. 332). We show that a step in the proof of this theorem is not correct by giving a counterexample. Nevertheless, the sufficient conditions remain true, and we offer a correction of the proof.
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This paper develops the concept of contractual equilibrium for repeated games with transferable utility, whereby the players negotiate cooperatively over their continuation strategies at the start of each period. Players may disagree in the negotiation phase, and continuation play may be suboptimal under disagreement. Under agreement, play is jointly optimal in the continuation game, and the pl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.002