A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Folk Theorem for One-Shot Bertrand Games
We show that bounded monopoly profits are essential for the uniqueness of the Bertrand paradox (zero profit) outcome. Otherwise, a folk theorem obtains for one-shot homogeneous product Bertrand games: any positive (but finite) payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. JEL Numbers: D43, C72
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.006