A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
WDI. We express our gratitude to the editor, John McMillan and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. ABSTRACT. We propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint, a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist, transitional, and market economies. Our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenome...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.02.006