A Politically Commercial Media System
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil∗
Does the rise of commercial mass media threaten or enhance the power of traditional political bosses in developing democracies? While access to outside information might increase political competition or prompt voters to reject corrupt politicians, bosses who can dominate local broadcasters may see an electoral benefit. I test this hypothesis by exploiting geographical variation in the coverage...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Veftímaritið Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1670-679X,1670-6803
DOI: 10.13177/irpa.a.2013.9.2.13