A Problem for Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology
It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledgean anti-luck intuition and an ability intuitionand that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledgeanti-luck virtue epistemologywhich can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in...
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Duncan Pritchard (et al. 2010, 2012a, 2012b) has recently shifted his view from an account that primarily understands knowledge in terms of the safety principle (a view mainly developed in his 2005 monograph on epistemic luck) to an ‘impure’ variety of virtue epistemology, which combines the safety principle with a weakened virtue-theoretic condition, a view that he calls anti-luck virtue epist...
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This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
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This paper begins with an introduction to four different prominent versions of process reliabilism about knowledge, namely, the simple K-reliabilism, John Greco’s robust virtue epistemology, Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and the Goldmanian Kreliabilism. Its main objective is to offer a counterexample, namely, the fewer barn façades case, to the anti-luck virtue epistemology,...
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3. Animal knowledge is essentially apt belief, to be distinguished from the more demanding reflective knowledge. This is not to say that the word ‘knows’ is ambiguous. Maybe it is, but distinguishing a kind of knowledge as “animal” knowledge requires no commitment to that linguistic thesis. Indeed it requires no definition of the word ‘knows’ at all. One might take this to be primitive and stil...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0165-0106,1572-8420
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x