A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

A puzzle about withholding

This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the commo...

Knowing About Diagrams

Understanding diagrams and using them in problem solving requires extensive knowledge about the properties of diagrams, what diagram elements denote, how their parts are distinguished and referenced, how they relate to linguistic statements, and so forth. This knowledge is most naturally represented linguistically. Nonetheless, diagrams or imaginal representations of them are used in substantiv...

A puzzle about belief updating

In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement ca...

A Puzzle About Ontological Commitments

A Puzzle about Further Facts∗

In metaphysics, there are a number of distinct but related questions about the existence of “further facts”—facts that are contingent relative to the physical structure of the universe. These include further facts about qualia, personal identity, and time. In this article I provide a sequence of examples involving computer simulations, ranging from one in which the protagonist can clearly concl...