A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts
THE relationship between legal rules and the strategies that commercial parties use to deal with risk is among the most important and least understood topics in law and economics. Organizational theorists have generally confined their analyses to the nature of the firm and other permanent relationships.' Academic commercial lawyers, in turn, have been far less venturesome than their corporate c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Legal Studies
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0047-2530,1537-5366
DOI: 10.1086/467863