A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the life cycle of a firm that produces good unknown quality. The manages its quality by investing while consumers learn via public breakthroughs; if fails to generate such breakthroughs, revenue falls and it eventually exits. Optimal investment depends on firm’s reputation (the market’s belief about quality) self-esteem own quality), is single-peaked in time since breakthrough. derive predictions distribution propose method decompose impact policy changes into selection effects. (JEL D11, D21, D25, D83, G31, L15)
منابع مشابه
A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190376