A retrospective on retrospective voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Retrospective Voting∗
We argue that optimal retrospective voting can be thought of as an equilibrium selection criterion—specifically, a criterion that selects so as to maximize voter welfare. Formalized this way, we go on to provide an informational rationale for retrospective voting. We show that a Voter can use retrospective voting to extract information from a Legislator with policy expertise. In particular, whe...
متن کاملOnline Appendix: Optimal Retrospective Voting
We begin by pointing out that, under this setup, it is without loss of generality to assume that the Voter ‘knows’ the Legislator’s random variable xl : Ω → R. To see this, let x∗v : Ω → R and xl : Ω → R be the actual random variables of the Voter and Legislator. Append to the game a set of mappings xl : Ω → R, viz. Xl, where Xl is a metric space. Also, append to the game a (transparent) prior ...
متن کاملRetrospective Voting: An Experimental Study
This essay reports on some experiments designed to study two candidate electoral competition when voters are 'retrospective' voters. The experiments consist of a sequence of elections in which subjects play the part of both voters and candidates. In each election the incumbent adopts a policy position in a one-dimensional policy space, and voters are paid (on the basis of single peaked utility ...
متن کاملExpectation Setting and Retrospective Voting
That citizens engage in retrospective voting is widely established in the literature. But to what extent is retrospection affected by the expectations that leaders set in advance? We develop a theoretical framework of how expectation setting affects voters’ retrospective evaluations of incumbent performance. To test the theory, we conduct a series of between-subjects experiments in which we ind...
متن کاملDemocratic Accountability and Retrospective Voting: A Laboratory Experiment∗
Understanding the incentives of politicians requires understanding the nature of voting behavior. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether voters focus on the problem of electoral selection or if they instead focus on electoral sanctioning. If voters are forward-looking but uncertain about politicians’ unobservable characteristics, then it is rational to focus on selection. But ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Political Behavior
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0190-9320,1573-6687
DOI: 10.1007/bf00987073