A simple logic for reasoning about incomplete knowledge
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A simple logic for reasoning about incomplete knowledge
The semantics of modal logics for reasoning about belief or knowledge is often described in terms of accessibility relations, which is too expressive to account for mere epistemic states of an agent. This paper proposes a simple logic whose atoms express epistemic attitudes about formulae expressed in another basic propositional language, and that allows for conjunctions, disjunctions and negat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0888-613X
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijar.2013.11.003