A Truthful Double Auction Framework for Promoting Femtocell Access
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred w...
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First-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheme is used for selling the goods in market that is a multi-million dollar industry for any popular event. But in a competitive environment is this FCFS efficient? In earlier literature it has been shown that the auction based alternative solutions using the framework of mechanism design, a sub field of game theory [18] can provide better results against FCFS in...
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In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles singleparametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multip...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Access
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2169-3536
DOI: 10.1109/access.2019.2904548