About Rules, Punishments and Rewards in Education
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards.
Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is p...
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Many institutional arrangements suggest that punishments and rewards each play a separate role in providing incentives. In New York City’s recent negotiations with its teacher’s union, for instance, the city sought a contract that would strengthen school principals’ ability to assign teachers to be cafeteria monitors, in part because this allows them to punish underperforming teachers. The cont...
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This paper develops a novel positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can privately assess the contribution of an agent to the welfare of a broader group. In the absence...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1877-0428
DOI: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.01.1280