Accounting information and corporate governance

Corporate Governance, Accounting Conservatism, and Manipulation

Prior studies have portrayed accounting conservatism as a tool that enables boards to perform their monitoring duties. We develop a model that suggests that the empirical association between conservatism and governance can also run in the opposite direction —only well-governed firms with suffi cient monitoring in place can fully utilize the benefits of conservative accounting. In our setting, c...

Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the...

Corporate Governance and Information Security

Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance

Disclosure is widely assumed to play an important role in corporate governance. Yet governance has not been the focus of previous academic analyses of disclosure. We consider disclosure in the context of corporate governance. We argue that disclosure is a two-edged sword. On one side, disclosure of information permits principals to make better decisions. On the other, it can create or exacerbat...

The Relationship between Corporate Governance Factors and Accounting Conservatism (Based on Basu\'s Model Evaluation)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance, the ownership percentage of major and institutional shareholders, auditor change, audit committee independence, and information asymmetry on accounting conservatism. Basu's model (1997) has been used to evaluate the relationship among variables. The present study is a post-event study, and the research sample includ...