منابع مشابه
Beautiful Lemons: Adverse Selection in Durable-Goods Markets with Sorting
We document a basic characteristic of adverse selection in secondhand markets for durable goods: goods with higher observed quality may have more adverse selection and hence lower unobserved quality. We provide a simple theoretical model to demonstrate this result, which is a consequence of the interaction of sorting between drivers over observed quality and adverse selection over unobserved qu...
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We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage during the launch phase of a new product. We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous and initially uninformed about their valuations but learn about them over time. Given demand uncertainty, fir...
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We develop a game-theoretic framework to investigate the competitive implications of consumer-to-consumer electronic marketplaces, which promote concurrent selling of new and used goods. In many e-marketplaces, where suppliers cannot directly use second-hand goods for practicing inter-temporal price discrimination, the threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods become significant. We ...
متن کاملCompetitive search markets for durable goods
This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than lowquality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers...
متن کاملDynamic sorting in durable goods markets with buyer heterogeneity
In a competitive dynamic durable good market where sellers have private information about quality, I identify certain ineffi ciencies that arise due to heterogeneity in buyers’ valuations. Even if the market induces dynamic sorting among sellers and all goods are eventually traded, ineffi ciency can arise because high valuation buyers buy early when low quality goods are sold, while high qualit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1097