Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality

Practical Reasoning and Rationality

Reasoning about rationality

We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a class of logics appropriate for reasoning about the rationality of players in games, and show that essentially the same axiomatization applies to a very wide class of decision rules. We also consider epistemic representations of games in which players may be uncertain as to what decision rules their opponents are using, and define in this con...

Against Requirements of Rationality

Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form ‘if ... ought ...’, or ‘ought ... if ...’? If the latter, how are we to understand the ‘if’? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications if ‘ought’ connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also ...

A Planning Theory of Practical Rationality

This paper combines ideas from recent philosophical work on rational agency and work in artificial intelligence on hierarchical non-linear planners which combine plan generation, execution, and monitoring, to produce a planning theory of rational agency for resource-bounded agents.

Non-cognitivism and Inconsistency