منابع مشابه
Overvalued Equity and Financing Decisions
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We investigate relations between inside ownership, managerial expenses and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis —Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) —provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's Q). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine ...
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We analyze how the agent’s initial wealth affects the principal’s expected profits in the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard. We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent’s utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coe...
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We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm’s sole shareholder. Utilizing a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database, we find evidence supporting several predictions of agency cost theo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Financial Management
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0046-3892,1755-053X
DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00090.x