Agency, properties and causation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agency and Mental Causation
A self or person does not appear to be identifiable with his or her organic body, nor with any part of it, such as the brain; and yet selves seem to be agents, capable of bringing about physical events (such as bodily movements) as causal consequences of certain of their conscious mental states. How is this possible in a universe in which, it appears, every physical event has a sufficient cause...
متن کاملCausation and the Awareness of Agency
I criticize the tendency to address the causal role of awareness in agency in terms of the awareness of agency, and argue that this distorts the causal import of experimental results in significant ways. I illustrate, using the work of Shaun Gallagher, how the tendency to focus on the awareness of agency obscures the role of extrospective awareness by considering it only in terms of what it con...
متن کاملCausation and the Objectification of Agency
ion (henceforth: ‘MoA’) promises, will not try to achieve more than it can deliver. In particular, this means that if a concept of free action is applied prospectively or retrospectively, the action does not really have to be free to underpin the causal judgment to which the concept of free action is applied. Causes are evaluated as hypothetically performed actions, but actions have been explai...
متن کاملCausation, Intervention and Agency—Woodward on Menzies and Price*
In his in uential book Making ings Happen (Oxford, ) and in other places, JimWoodward has noted some affinities between his own account of causation and that of Menzies and Price (‘Causation as a secondary quality’, BJPS, ), but argued that the latter view is implausibly ‘subjective’. In this piece I discussWoodward’s criticisms. I argue that theMenzies and Price view is not as different fromW...
متن کاملMental causation and mental properties†
The aim of this paper is to defend the causal homogeneity of functional, mental properties against Kim’s attack. It is argued that (a) token identity is sufficient for mental causation, that (b) token identity implies a sort of functional reduction, but that (c) nonetheless functional, mental properties can be causally homogeneous despite being multiply realizable: multiple composition is suffi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Frontiers of Philosophy in China
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1673-3436,1673-355X
DOI: 10.1007/s11466-011-0146-2