Agenda control in coalition formation

Farsightedness in Coalition Formation

Coalition Formation in Manets

Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used as incentives to form coalitions inside the network. In this paper, we study coalition fo...

Coalition Formation

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine withingroup actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes a variety of solution concepts, using an umbrella model that adopts an explicit real-time approach. Playe...

Potential, coalition formation and coalition structure∗

The present paper studies a new potential function of a cooperative game with a coalition structure. When define a marginal contribution of each player, a notion of a coalition formation by Hart and Kurz (1983) is considered. Our potential is a real-valued function in contrast to Winter (1992)’s one which is vector-valued function whose dimension is the number of elements in the coalition struc...

On coalition formation: durable coalition structures

We define a solution to the problem of coalition formation that applies to purely hedonic games. Coalition structures satisfying our requirements are called durable, and we interpret them as much more likely to last than those coalition structures not satisfying the requirements, which we call transient. Durability results from a combination of foresight and extreme risk aversion on the part of...