Agent-Based Modeling of Construction Firms’ Organizational Behavior in Public Tenders

A key problem of construction firms’ management and economy is organization effective participation in public tenders. The direct executor, who determines the price contract, may be interested obtaining as many contracts possible. It means that his strategic behavior tender to undervalue each individual offer. At same time, such a strategy can source risk project loss because actual costs lower than contract won. not this. On other hand, overpricing lead reduction number won, which seem either for head or executor an organization. article discusses whether profits firm increase by using more precise method calculating estimated cost. second question is—which staff will benefit from methods? aim this work test these hypotheses with instrumentality agent-based modeling. Profit values firms were obtained computer simulation Results 1500 experiments are presented decision tree. seen when method, win tenders almost two times less often. However, they incur losses inaccurate method. If made profit margin was always greater Moreover, results game-theoretic modeling given. Values objective functions obtained, taking into account reward won penalty miscalculating cost work. has been proved methods beneficial both executor. concluded confirmed increases efficiency firm.