Agent-Principal Problem in Financial Distribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Politická ekonomie
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0032-3233,2336-8225
DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1208