Agent takeover risk of principal in outsourcing relationships
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Outsourcing Relationships: Designing 'Optimal' Contracts: A Principal-Agent-Theoretic Approach
Information Systems literature emphasizes the importance of efficient contracts for managing outsourcing relationships. However, there is a lack of proven and tested contract designs in theory as well as in practice. With the help of Economic Theory we analyze the underlying dynamics of an outsourcing relationship. Based on mathematical Principal-Agent-Theory we aim at answering the following q...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Global Business and Economics Review
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1097-4954,1745-1329
DOI: 10.1504/gber.2010.036057