Agential obligation as non-agential personal obligation plus agency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agential obligation as non-agential personal obligation plus agency
I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in [P. McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2) (2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However, the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main curr...
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The purpose of this paper is to explore a new deontic operator for representing what an agent ought to do; the operator is cast against the background of a modal treatment of action developed by Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff, which itself relies on Arthur Prior's indeterministic tense logic. The analysis developed here of what an agent ought to do is based on a dominance ordering adapted from...
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In evaluating any deontic claim, be it a claim about personal or impersonal obligation, we need a conception of the relevant possibilities. But which possibilities count as relevant will depend on whether we are evaluating claims about personal or impersonal obligation. When we are asking what a given agent, x, ought to do at time t, we hold fixed all those facts that are outside this agent‟s c...
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How are claims about what people ought to do related to claims about what ought to be the case? That is, how are claims about of personal obligation, of the form s ought to φ, related to claims about impersonal obligation, of the form it ought to be the case that p? Many philosophers have held that the former type of claim can be reduced to the latter. In particular, they have held a view known...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Logic
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1570-8683
DOI: 10.1016/j.jal.2004.01.006