Aggregating Local Preferences to Guide Marginal Policy Adjustments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Aggregating Local Preferences To Guide Policy
How could well-being data, for example those based on survey measures, be used for guiding policy? Exploring one direction, we analyze a mechanism that takes as inputs estimates of policy effects on different groups’ utility proxies (constructed from the well-being data), and aggregates them into policy-change recommendations. We develop three justifications for the mechanism based on: an analo...
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Preferences are not always expressible via complete linear orders: sometimes it is more natural to allow for the presence of incomparable outcomes. This may hold both in the agents’ preference ordering and in the social order. In this article, we consider this scenario and study what properties it may have. In particular, we show that, despite the added expressivity and ability to resolve confl...
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Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Idealadvisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the adviso...
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SOMMARIO/ABSTRACT Preferences typically define a partial ordering over outcomes. A number of formalisms like soft constraints and CP-nets exists to specify such partial or-derings. In situations involving multiple agents, we need to combine the preferences of several individuals. In this paper, we consider each agent as voting on whether they prefer one outcome to another. We prove that, under ...
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Given a society confronting a set of alternatives A, we consider the aggregation of individual preferences over the power set A of A into a social preference over A. In case we allow individuals to have any complete and transitive preference over A, Arrow’s impossibility theorem naturally applies. However, the Arrovian impossibility prevails, even when the set of admissible preferences over A i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.605