Aggregation rules for surface parameters in global models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Hydrology and Earth System Sciences
سال: 1997
ISSN: 1607-7938
DOI: 10.5194/hess-1-217-1997