Agreeing to agree
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Deludedly Agreeing to Agree
We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all the agreements literature). We show that even when the truth axiom is not assumed it turns out that players will find it impossible to agree to disagree under fairly broad conditions.
متن کاملAgreeing to agree
Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty finite e...
متن کاملAgreeing Now to Agree
*We would like to thank Bengt Holmstrom, Jozsef Sakovics, and Jonathan Thomas for helpful conversations. We acknowledge financial support from the U.S. National Science Foundation through the National Bureau of Economic Research; the Leverhulme Trust; and the U.K. Economic and Social Research Council. This paper was written while the first author was on sabbatical at the London School of Econom...
متن کاملDELUDEDLY AGREEING TO AGREE By
We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all the agreements literature). Agreement and disagreement are studied under models of belief in three broad settings: non-probabilistic decision models, probabilistic belief revision of priors, and dynamic communication ...
متن کاملAgreeing to agree and Dutch books
We say that agreeing to agree is possible for an event E if there exist posterior beliefs of the agents with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the agents’ posteriors for E coincide. We propose a notion called Dutch book which is a profile of interim contracts between an outsider and the agents based on the occurrence of E, such that the outsider makes positive profit in all s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te578