Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic
Aumann’s agreeing to disagree theorem is a central theorem of game theory. This result says that if two agents have a common prior, then they cannot agree (have common knowledge of their posteriors) to disagree (while these posteriors are not identical). This thesis looks at the agreeing to disagree theorem from the perspective of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. The first goal of the the...
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A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann’s (1976) agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpers...
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A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann’s (1976) agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpers...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0280-6