Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities When Preferences Are Single-peaked
We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. Two natural procedures (up methods and temporary satisfaction methods) are proposed to solve these problems. They are constructed by using priority methods on the cartesian product of agents and integer numbers, interpreted either as peaks or opposite peaks. Thus, two families of solutions arise t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SERIEs
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1869-4187,1869-4195
DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0046-7