(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there no fully-efficient incentive compatible mechanism this problem maintains balanced budget. design simple robust mechanisms obtain approximate efficiency with these properties. show even minimal use of statistical data can yield good approximation results. then demonstrate how bilateral-trade be used as “black-box” constructing in more general environments. Finally, we dominant-strategy incentive-compatible cannot guarantee any constant-factor to optimal gains from trade.
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(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.011