Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations
e goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a “fair” way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the b...
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Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which ...
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Article history: Received 20 May 2013 Received in revised form 7 July 2014 Accepted 9 July 2014 Available online xxxx Communicated by B. Doerr
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We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms satisfying each requirement separately have been studied extensively, but there are few results on mechanisms achieving both. We are interested in those allocat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0895-4801,1095-7146
DOI: 10.1137/19m124397x