Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities
I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of conceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of) our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our know...
متن کاملNorms, causes, and alternative possibilities
We propose Knobe’s explanation of his cases encounters a dilemma: Either his explanation works and, counterintuitively, morality is not at the heart of these effects; or morality is at the heart of the effects and Knobe’s explanation does not succeed. This dilemma is then used to temper the use of the Knobe paradigm for discovering moral norms. Knobe presents two kinds of theories that compete ...
متن کاملTime, foreknowledge, and alternative possibilities
In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker’s critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson’s claim that Anselmian freedom is incom...
متن کاملNatural Autonomy and Alternative Possibilities
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].. University of Illinois Press and North American Philosoph...
متن کاملFrom Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities∗
Humeans and non-Humeans commonly and reasonably agree that there may be necessary connections (“necessities”, for short) between entities that are identical—e.g., Hesperus and Phosphorus, water and H2O—or merely partly distinct—e.g., sets and their individual members, fusions and their individual parts, instances of determinates and determinables, members of certain natural kinds and certain of...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Disputatio
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0873-626X
DOI: 10.1515/disp-2017-0008