Ambiguity aversion, modern Bayesianism and small worlds
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion
Consider the following choice problem, known as “Ellsberg’s three-color urn example”, or simply the “Ellsberg Paradox” (Ellsberg [7]). An urn contains 30 red balls, and 60 green and blue balls, in unspecified proportions; subjects are asked to compare (i) a bet on a red draw vs. a bet on a green draw, and (ii) a bet on a red or blue draw vs. a bet on a green or blue draw. If the subject wins a ...
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In this paper I use the smooth ambiguity model developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) to define the concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty premia in a way analogous to what Pratt (1964) did in the risk theory literature. I show that those concepts may be useful to quantify the effect ambiguity has on the welfare of economic agents. I also provide local approximations of these prem...
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Under which condition does the set of desirable uncertain prospects expand when wealth increases? We show that the decreasing concavity (DC) of the utility function is necessary and sufficient in the −maxmin expected utility model. In the smooth ambiguity aversion model with the ambiguity valuation function , the DC of and of ◦ is necessary and sufficient. An alternative definition of d...
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This paper considers when the utility function of the bidders is ambiguity averse, how does the bidding strategy differ in four classical auction mechanisms. In particular, if there is no information affiliation, i.e., when first order sealed auction is equivalent to English auction in terms of bidding, bidders may bid higher or lower relative to ambiguity neutral case. From the seller’s point ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Open Research Europe
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2732-5121
DOI: 10.12688/openreseurope.13196.1