An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions
Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse emarketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1460-7425
DOI: 10.18564/jasss.1557