An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Ascending Auction with Multidimensional Signals
A single-item ascending auction in which agents observe multidimensional Gaussian signals about their valuation of the good is studied. A class of equilibria is constructed in two steps: (i) the private signals of each agent are projected into a one-dimensional equilibrium statistic, and (ii) the equilibrium strategies are constructed “as if” each agent observed only his equilibrium statistic. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104938